Ngaoundéré–N'Djamena Railway Route: Which Option Best Serves Chad's Interests?

1. Background and Stakes

The railway project linking Ngaoundéré, the regional capital of Adamawa in Cameroon, to N'Djamena is one of the most strategically important infrastructure files for Chad's connectivity. Part of the bilateral cooperation agreement signed in 2014 between Cameroon and Chad, the project aims to give Chad — a landlocked country — a reliable rail alternative to road transport on one of the corridors most critical to its foreign trade.

The feasibility study, completed in 2024 and submitted to Cameroon's Ministry of Transport, identified several route scenarios whose costs and alignments vary considerably. On June 5, 2026, the Cameroonian presidency ruled in favor of the so-called "western" route (Garoua – Maroua – Kousséri – N'Djamena), a choice immediately contested by Chad's Ministry of Transport, which stated on June 11 that "no final validation" had been made and that "all options remain under study at this stage."

This sequence of events opens a crucial negotiating window. This note aims to provide an objective assessment of the stakes for Chad, to compare the three route options against tangible criteria (cost, length within Chadian territory, economic spillovers, governance), and to formulate position recommendations for Chadian authorities for the remainder of the bilateral discussions.

2. The Three Route Options on the Table

Three routes have been studied to connect Ngaoundéré to N'Djamena. They differ fundamentally in their geography, their cost, and — the central point of this note — in the share of the line that actually runs through Chadian territory.

2.1. Option 1 — Western Route (Garoua – Maroua – Kousséri)

This route, chosen by the Cameroonian presidential decision of June 5, 2026, links Ngaoundéré to N'Djamena via the main cities of northern Cameroon: Garoua, Maroua, then Kousséri at the border, before reaching the Chadian capital directly. According to Africa Intelligence, this choice was driven less by economic logic than by the desire to open up and stabilize Cameroonian areas (Maroua, Garoua) affected by unrest surrounding the October 2025 presidential election.

"The western choice, considered less logical from an economic standpoint, was favored to serve Maroua and Garoua, two cities affected by unrest surrounding the October 2025 presidential election." — Africa Intelligence, reported by Tchadinfos, June 11, 2026

For Chad, this route offers an immediate advantage: a direct, undetoured entry into N'Djamena via Kousséri. But it carries three significant drawbacks. First, its cost is the highest of the three options (CFA 4,829 billion). Second, most of the line — and therefore most of the construction work, construction jobs, stations, and economic spillover effects — lies within Cameroonian territory. Finally, and perhaps most sensitively, this route primarily serves a Cameroonian domestic political agenda (pacifying insurgency-affected areas in northern Cameroon), with Chad's own development priorities not being the decisive criterion in the decision.

2.2. Option 2 — Southern Chad Route (Moundou – Kélo – Bongor)

This option links Ngaoundéré to N'Djamena by crossing southern Chad through the cities of Moundou, Kélo, and Bongor. Moundou, Chad's second city and capital of Logone Occidental, is the industrial and agricultural heart of southern Chad: it concentrates most of the cotton sector, a major industrial brewery, and significant oil activity. Kélo and Bongor are secondary but growing urban centers, located on important agricultural production corridors.

Financially, this route is the least expensive of the three options (CFA 2,988 billion) — about 38% less than the western route and nearly 40% less than the central route. Geographically, its key distinguishing feature is that most of its length runs through Chadian territory — unlike the other two options, where Cameroon accounts for most of the route and therefore most of the construction and operating spillovers.

From a regional development perspective, this route would directly open up southern Chad's economic hub, complementary to the N'Djamena axis, and would give Chad's cotton sector and agro-industry rail access to the Cameroonian network and, ultimately, to the ports of Douala or Kribi. This is a structural gain that goes beyond simply connecting to the capital: it is a territorial development tool for a Chadian region historically underserved by heavy infrastructure.

2.3. Option 3 — Central Route (Figuil – Pala – Kélo – Bongor)

This third route, the longest of the three, crosses an intermediate zone between the previous two, via Figuil, Pala, Kélo, and Bongor. It combines the drawbacks of both: a cost even higher than the western route (CFA 4,948 billion, the highest of the three options), without the benefit of a direct connection to the capital that the western route offers, or the concentration of the route within Chadian territory that the southern route offers.

This option appears to be the least favorable to Chad on a strictly cost/benefit basis, and to our knowledge has not been retained in recent Cameroonian decisions. It is mentioned here for completeness of the comparative analysis.

The diagram below places these three routes in their geographic context, at the border between Chad and Cameroon, with a locator inset showing the position of this area within both countries.

Comparison Table of the Three Options

Source: 2024 feasibility study and press synthesis, see "Sources" below.

3. Why the Western Route, as It Stands, Does Not Fully Serve Chad's Interests

The western route has an obvious and immediately visible advantage: it directly links Kousséri to N'Djamena, giving the Chadian capital a railway gateway with no detour. It is precisely this apparent advantage that risks masking deeper imbalances in how the project's benefits are distributed.

1. Concentration of the route within Cameroonian territory. Of the roughly 1,400 km of the western route, almost the entire alignment — Ngaoundéré, Garoua, Maroua, all the way to Kousséri — lies within Cameroon. Only the final stretch to N'Djamena is on Chadian soil. In a railway project of this scale, the location of the works will directly determine where construction jobs, logistics bases, and maintenance centers are located, as well as the spillover effects on local economies (lodging, catering, subcontracting) during the construction phase, which will span several years.
2. A decision-making logic dictated by Cameroon's political agenda. The June 5 decision was explicitly motivated by the need to stabilize post-election areas of Cameroon (Maroua, Garoua), not by a comparative analysis of economic benefits for both countries. If such a precedent becomes the negotiating norm, it places Chad in a structurally reactive position: its own development priorities (southern Chad, the cotton sector, Moundou) carry no weight in a decision that remains an internal Cameroonian calculation.
3. A higher cost without proportional territorial benefit for Chad. At CFA 4,829 billion, this route is the second most expensive of the three options. If financing (notably via Etihad Rail and the United Arab Emirates) is structured in proportion to national route lengths or expected benefits, a Chad whose territory accounts for only a small share of the route could end up contributing — financially, through sovereign guarantees, or through economic concessions — to a project whose construction benefits mostly accrue to the neighboring country.
4. Connectivity for a single destination. The western route effectively serves N'Djamena but does not open up any other Chadian region. The country's south — the cotton and agro-industry hub, and the country's second-largest population center around Moundou — would remain just as remote from major logistics corridors, even though a railway project of this scale represents a rare opportunity for structural transformation.

4. The Southern Chad Route: An Option That Rebalances the Equation

By contrast, the southern Chad route (Moundou – Kélo – Bongor) offers a configuration in which structural advantages converge in Chad's favor, without requiring any departure from the principle of a rail connection with Cameroon and, beyond it, with the ports of the Gulf of Guinea.

1. Overall cost about 38% lower than the western route (CFA 2,988 bn vs. CFA 4,829 bn), which reduces the project's overall financing burden and, potentially, the share of guarantees or co-financing required from Chad.
2. A route mostly located in Chadian territory, meaning that most construction jobs, local subcontracting contracts, and related infrastructure (stations, depots, maintenance workshops) would be located in Chad.
3. Direct opening-up of southern Chad, particularly Moundou — Chad's second city and the heart of its cotton sector — which would gain structuring rail access to the regional network without relying solely on roads.
4. Geographic diversification of entry points into the Chadian rail network, which would no longer be limited to the single Kousséri – N'Djamena junction, reducing the country's vulnerability to a single crossing point.

It should be noted that this route does not deprive N'Djamena of a connection: the line would continue to link Bongor to the capital, serving N'Djamena while simultaneously connecting the south of the country. The argument is therefore not "south versus north," but a more balanced distribution of the project's effects across the whole of Chadian territory.

5. Position Recommendations for Chad

In light of the above, and given that Chad's Ministry of Transport has explicitly reiterated that "all options remain under study at this stage," four negotiating priorities are recommended.

5.1. Actively Advocate for the Southern Chad Route in Bilateral Discussions

Chad has solid factual arguments — lower cost, a route mostly within its territory, and the opening-up of a major economic hub — to propose or support the southern Chad route as a credible alternative to the western route. This option should not be presented as a rejection of Cameroon's choice, but as a "win-win" solution: a lower overall cost for the whole project, while still meeting the goal of a rail connection between the two countries.

5.2. Demand Governance and Financing Proportional to National Route Length

Whatever route is ultimately chosen, Chad should obtain, within the bilateral agreement, a clause establishing joint governance of the corridor, as well as a financing structure (notably under the protocol with Etihad Rail and the United Arab Emirates) that reflects the actual split of the route between the two countries. A predominantly Cameroonian route should not imply a Chadian contribution proportionally equivalent to that of a predominantly Chadian route.

5.3. Make Any Approval Conditional on a Comparative Impact Study

Chad should request that the final decision be based on a comparative economic impact study, weighing the effects of each route on regional development in both countries — not solely on the Cameroonian domestic political considerations that, according to Africa Intelligence, drove the June 5 decision. This approach is fully in line with the spirit of the June 11 statement by Chad's Ministry of Transport, which calls for "calm, discernment, and vigilance" in the face of premature announcements.

5.4. Secure Guaranteed Port Access in All Cases

Regardless of which route is chosen within Cameroonian territory, Chad should ensure that the final agreement explicitly guarantees the rail network's connection to a deep-water port — Douala or, eventually, Kribi — so that the project's ultimate goal (reducing Chad's dependence on road transport for its foreign trade) is not undermined by successive decisions on Cameroon's internal route.

6. Conclusion

The June 5, 2026 decision in favor of the western route, while it offers a direct and symbolically strong connection to N'Djamena, is based primarily on Cameroonian logic and entails significant imbalances to the detriment of Chad's economic interests: a higher cost, a route lying mostly outside national territory, and no opening-up of the country's south.

The official denial issued by Chad's Ministry of Transport on June 11 confirms that the decision is not final and that the negotiating window remains open. Chad therefore has a genuine opportunity to make the case — based on factual evidence rather than arguments of principle — for an alternative option, the southern Chad route, which would reduce the project's overall cost while concentrating more of its benefits on Chadian territory and economic development.

Beyond the choice of route alone, the central issue for Chad is to ensure that the governance, financing, and economic benefits of the future Ngaoundéré–N'Djamena rail corridor are negotiated on a basis of reciprocity and proportionality — an essential condition for an infrastructure project of this scale to become a genuine lever for national connectivity, rather than simply an extension toward N'Djamena of a network designed primarily to serve Cameroonian priorities.

Sources

• Tchadinfos, « Chemin de fer Cameroun-Tchad : Yaoundé donne son feu vert pour la ligne ferroviaire Ngaoundéré – N'Djamena », June 11, 2026.
• Tchadinfos, « Chemin de fer Tchad–Cameroun : N'Djamena dément toute validation définitive du tracé Ngaoundéré–N'Djamena », June 11, 2026.
• Tchadinfos, « Les Émirats arabes unis rejoignent le projet ferroviaire Tchad-Cameroun », June 10, 2026.
• Journal du Tchad, « Chemin de fer Tchad-Cameroun : la validation du tracé final encore en attente », June 12, 2026.
• Agence Ecofin, « L'étude de faisabilité de la voie ferroviaire Cameroun-Tchad achevée, plusieurs options d'itinéraire », May 2024.